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STUDENT NoTEs
protect itself against the multiplication of their kind, and must this
be so even though a simple surgical operation not appreciably dangerous and involving the removal of no sound organs from the body,
might be discharged from custody and become self supporting to the
great advantage of society? May not one liberty be thus restored
'
through the deprivation of another liberty?" 2
The police power is held by the great weight of authority and the
Supreme Court of the nation (while only denied by one state) to be
broad enough to embrace sterilization of the mentally defective." The
proposed statute meets no objection from this angle.
As we have seen, the proposed statute provides for the due process
of law; it does not violate the equal protection clause; it meets the
constitutional objection to cruel and unusual punishment; it is a valid
exercise of the police power. If the proposed statute would be adopted
in Kentucky its constitutionality could not be questioned.
JAY F. AnwoLD.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO ARREST WITHOUT A
WARRANT-FELONIES
Five factual situations present themselves in which there is a
right to arrest without a warrant In the case of felonies: (1) Where
it would seem that a felony is about to be committed by the person arrested, (2) where the person arrested is in the act of committing a
felony, (3) where the person arrested has committed a felony, (4)
where a felony has been committed and the person arrested is reasonably suspected of having committed it, and (5) where no felony has
been committed, but the person arrested is reasonably suspected of
having committed one. The aim of this note is to show what are the
rules as to arrest without a warrant applicable to each situation, both
at the common law and in Kentucky. The common law rule will be
taken up first, and then the rule in Kentucky.
At common law, an officer may arrest without a warrant to prevent the commission of a felony. An officer must always interfere to
prevent an attempted felony; he may arrest the offender if necessary,
1
even though the attempt to commit the felony be only a misdemeanor.
This statement represents the weight of authority in this country. In
2
Geroux v. Tihe State, it was held that an officer may arrest to prevent
an injury where an injury is about to be inflicted or parties are then
in the act of preparation for its immediate infliction, but not where
a 11 Va. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
"State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer,
man, supra, note 9; Brewer v. Bulk,
never questioning that sterilization of
exercise of the police power.
*Clark's Crim. Pro., Secs. 10-12;
2(S6.
' 40 Tex. 97 (1874).
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supra, note 10; State v. Troutsupra, note 1. Other decisions
the mentally deficient is a valid
9 Halsbury's Laws of England
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the threat indicates an intention of some future indefinite injury contemplated, not being then prepared for by any act then done or spoken.
It might be argued that this rule is too broad since an attempt to commit certain felonies is only a misdemeanor. However, most attempted
felonies involve breach of the peace, and it is settled law in most jurisdictions that an officer may arrest to prevent breach of the peace It
necessary. Even where the attempt is only a misdemeanor, it is submitted that the same rule should apply. It is certainly better to stop
a crime before it is committed than to allow the injurious result to be
attained. The right to arrest here arises from the necessity of preventing crime and preserving the peace and good order of society.
An officer may arrest a person without a warrant who is in the
act of committing a felony.' It is to be noticed that in this situation,
at least part of the criminal act is committed in the presence of the
officer. Further, the crime is in fact accomplished at least in part.
The arrest must be made. It is too great an incumbrance on the
officer to require that he wait until a warrant is issued before he can
make the arrest.
An officer may arrest a felon without a warrant after he has committed a felony. Another statement of the rule is to the effect that a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person
to be arrested has committed a felony, although not in the presence
of the officer. 4 This rule seems to be too clear and of too general 1pplication to need much explanation. Many criminals would escape If
the officer were forced to run to a magistrate every time he saw a criminal before he could arrest him. The court in Holley v. Mie says,
"My understanding of the law is, that if a felony has In fact been
committed by the person arrested, the arrest may be justified by any
person without a warrant, whether there is time to obtain one or
not."8 This statement would seem to apply as well to officers as to
private individuals.
We have now dealt with our first three factual situations. The
next one is where a felony has in fact been committed, and the person
arrested may reasonably be suspected of having done so. In such a
situation an officer may arrest without a warrant, and he will be
justified even though the person arrested is innocent of the crlmeY "It
has been said that this rule goes back to the Year Books."' The statements in the English cases are to the same effect. "If a felony has
actually been committed, any man, upon reasonable grounds of suspicion, may justify apprehending the suspected person to carry him
3A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., Sec. 21(a); Sheets v. Atherton, 62 Vt.
229, 19 Atl. 926 (1890); People v. Wolven, 7 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 89 (1848).
'A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., Sec. 21 (b).
53 Wend. (N. Y.) 350, 20 Am. Dec. 702 (1829).
6 See also dictum in Com. v. Cary, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 246 (1852).
'See A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., Sec. 21(c); Clark's Crim. Pro.,
Secs. 10-12.
822 Mich. Law Rev., 673 at 685.
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before a magistrate."' "Under the common law, if a felony were actually committed, a person might be arrested without a warrant by
any one, if he were reasonably suspected of having committed the fel1
ony." ' The matter of the reasonableness of the suspicion is for the
jury to determine.u
An officer may arrest a person whom he reasonably suspects of
having committed a felony, although, in fact, no felony may have been
2ommitted. This rule, of necessity, includes a reasonable suspicion
that a felony has been committed. The early English rule was that
an officer was justified in making an arrest on probable suspicion only,
where a felony had actually been committed or a dangerous wounding
whereby a felony was likely to result." This rule was followed in
Ledwith v. Catchpole." However a breaking away was soon evident.
1
In Hobbs v. Brarscomb,
Certain exceptions were first allowed.
the court recognized the early rule above, but allowed an officer to
justify the arrest if he took the person into custody on a charge preferred by another, though in fact no felony had been done. This same
15
rule Is followed in White v. Taylor,' where the court said, "If a regular charge is made before him (the officer), he is warranted by law in
6
In Lawrence v. Hedger," it was said
committing the party charged."'
that certain officers could arrest at night without warrant on suspicion
of a felony, although there was no proof of a felony having been committed. It was here recognized that the old rule placed too great a
limitation on the officer, and that a broader power had to be placed in
his hands. The requirement of actual commission of a felony was res
pudiated in Samuel v. Payne.' The court in this case considered this
requirement as inconvenient and narrow, and said that the officer did
his duty in carrying the suspect before a magistrate.
Apparently what is the latest and more generally accepted view
is the rule as was first stated. The statement as laid down by Lord
"
Tenterden in Beckwith v. Philby is: "A constable having reasonable
grounds to suspect that a felony has been committed is authorized
to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be made by the proper
'
This rule as stated is substantially in accord with the
authorities. "
*Samuel v. Payne, 1 Dougl. 359 (1780).
"Hadley v. Perks (1866), 1 Q. B. 444. See also Lawrence v.
Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14 (1810); Nicholson v. Hardwick, 5 Car. & P. 495
(1833).
U Nicholson v. Hardwick, supra, note 10.
4 Blk. Comm. 292.
1
Cald. 291 (1783).
143

Camp. 420 (1813).

14 Esp. 80 (1801).
16See also M'Cloughan v. Clayton, 1 Holt N. P. 478 (1816).
1?Supra, note 10.
1 Supra, note 9.
6 B. & C. 635 (1827).
" This statement is quite in accord with the statement in Samuel
v. Payne, supra, note 9. See also Nicholson v. Hardwick, supra, note 10,
and Davis. v. Russel, 5 Bing. 255 (1829), where this ruling is cited
with approval, and Hadley v. Perks, supra, note 10.
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American authorities. The statement in the A. L. I. Code of Criminal
Procedure" is, "A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
where he has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or
is being committed, and reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is committing it." In Korciellsk v.
The State,2 defendant was found guilty of violating a state statute
which made it a felony to transport intoxicating liquors. The sheriff
was informed that defendant was transporting such. The sheriff
stopped defendant's car to ask him about his tail-light which was not
burning, and saw a keg in the car. He then arrested defendant without a warrant. Helcl: That a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when he has reasonable and probable cause for believing that a
felony is being, or has been, committed by the person arrested. In
People v. Bressler," an arrest without a warrant was justified where
the officer had information which would justify a reasonable man in
believing that a felony had been committed."
We have now briefly discussed the rules which govern the right
of an officer to arrest without a warrant in each of the five situations
listed above. It must now be our purpose to discuss the corresponding
rights of private persons, and to see how they differ, if at all, from
the rights of the officer.
As to situation one, a private individual may arrest without a
warrant to prevent the commission of a felony. The case of Handcock
v. Baker,5 was an action for false imprisonment. Defendants were
passing in the street, and heard plaintiff feloniously assaulting his
wife. They entered and arrested plaintiff without a warrant. Held:
That it is lawful for a private person to do anything to prevent the
perpetration of a felony. This would seem, perhaps, to be a little
broad. The better rule is that a person may use the necessary force
and no more, and, if necessary, arrest to prevent the commission of the
felony.2 It is to be noted that this rule necessarily implies that at
least part of the criminal act has been done in the presence of the
person making the arrest.
A private person may arrest without a warrant, a person who Is
in the act of committing a felony. The statement of the Federal
Court as to this rule is, "A private person has the same right as an
officer to arrest without a warrant if a felony is being committed in
his presence.' 21 This rule has been upheld in various state courts."
Sec. 21(d)
m158 N. E. (Ind.) 902 (1927).
2223 Mich. 595, 194 N. W. 559 (1923).
"This rule is followed in State v. Moore, 225 S. W. 1056 (1921);
Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121, 64 N. W. 722 (1895); and in McCarthy v.
DeArmit, 99 Pa. St. 63 (1881).
3 B. & P. 260 (1880).
"Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 (1871); see also Clark's Crim.
Pro. at p. 54 and cases there cited in the footnote.
'Angello v. U. S., 290 Fed. 671 (1923).
"'See People v. Governale, 193 N. Y. 581, 86 N. E. 554 (1908), and
Brooks v. Com., 61 Pa. St. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 645 (1869).
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A private individual may arrest, without a warrant, a person who
has committed a felony. This statement seems to be too well established to be seriously questioned. The rule, as stated, includes cases
where the offense was committed both in the presence and out of the
presence of the person making the arrest. Texas, however, refuses
to permit a private person to arrest for a felony without a warrant
when the offense is not committed in the presence of the person making the arrest." However, this decision is based on a Texas statute
and is directly contra to the majority common law view. The rule
as first stated is the prevailing one. O
We have now discussed the rules applicable to our first three
situations. The rules which govern in the last two must now be
taken up. A private person may arrest without a warrant, a person
who is reasonably to be suspected of having committed a felony,
though in fact he may not have done so, if in fact a felony has been
committed. A private person will be liable for false arrest and imprisonment if he arrests a person on reasonable suspicion of having
committed a felony, and the person is not guilty, and no felony has
in fact been committed. In these two rules we find the essence of the
distinction between the right to arrest by an officer and by a private
person. It is to be noted that the right to arrest by a private person
goes practically as far as the right of the officer. But the difference
Is this: a private person acts at his peril when he does not know
whether a felony has been committed or not. If one has not, he will
be liable for false arrest even though he have reasonable grounds for
suspicion.
The rules as to these situations as we have stated them appear
to cover the majority view of the matter. The statements of the
English courts are substantially in accord: "There is this distinction
between a private individual and a constable: in order to justify the
former in causing the imprisonment of a person, he must not only
make out a reasonable ground of suspicion, but he must prove that a
felony has actually been committed; whereas, a constable, having
reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony has been committed, is
authorized to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be made
by the proper authorities."3
On this matter American jurisdictions are divided into four groups:
(1) The states in this group follow the rules which we have laid
down as to the first three situations, but refuse to allow a person who
arrests on reasonable suspicion without a warrant, to justify the arrest
even if a felony has been committed where the person arrested is not
guilty of the offense charged. In Rowan v. Sawin, it was held that the
"Lacey v. State, 7 Tex. Crim. App. 403 (1879).
"A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., Sec. 22; Clark's Crim. Pro., Secs. 10-12;
Com. v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 Atl. 211 (1922); Gold v. Armer, 140
N. Y. App. 73, 124 N. Y. S. 1069 (1910).
n Lord Tenterden in Beckwith v. Philby, suPra, note 19.
"5 Cush. (Mass.) 281 (1850).
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arrest by a private person without a warrant can only be justified by
proving such guilt.
(2) The next rule is the one which is stated above as the general
rule. This is the majority view and is followed In twenty-nine jurisdictions." The court in Imler v. Yeager6 says, "When a felony has
been committed, any private person may, without a warrant arrest
one whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of having committed
it, but such an arrest is illegal if no felony has in fact been committed
by anyone." A similar statement is found in Reuch v. McGregor:" "A
private person is justified in arresting, when a felony has actually
been committed, and there is probable ground to fairly suspect the
person guilty."'"
(3) "When the person arrested has committed a felony although
not in his presence." This provision is found in the codes of two states,
Arizona and Louisiana.
(4) Some four states allow private persons to go as far as the
officer in making arrests without a warrant on reasonable suspicion.
This expansion is found in the codes of all four states, and Is not the
common law rule. Kentucky is one of these states, but this matter
n
will be taken up more in detail later.
"
In the discussion above, we have laid down certain general rules.
Now let us examine the decisions in this state and see how the Kentucky rules line up with those above. The method followed is to restate the general rule and then to follow with a brief discussion of the
Kentucky law. The rule in Kentucky as to officers Is governed by
Section 36 of the Kentucky Criminal Code: "A peace officer may make
an arrest without a warrant when a public offense is committed in his
presence, or when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the
person arrested has committed a felony."
As to our first situation, our general rule is that an officer may
arrest without a warrant to prevent the commission of a felony. As
near as the writer has been able to find, there are no Kentucky cases
exactly in point. However, some help may be derived from the case
of Biggs v. Commonwealth.3 This was an indictment for assault with
intent to murder. The officer had a reasonable belief that defendant
was about to commit a felony. The officer then attempted to stop defendant, who greviously wounded the officer. The officer then attempted
to arrest defendant. Held: That it was the duty of the pfficer to prevent
3 This rule is followed in Palmer v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 99 Me.
399, 42 Atl. 800 (1899), and in Jacques v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 244
Mass, 438, 138 N. E. 843 (1923). There are seven American jurisdietions which follow this rule. See comm. to Sec. 22, A. L. I. Code Crim.
Pro.
,See comm. to Sec. 22, A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., pp. 240-242.
245 S. W. (Mo. App.) 200 (1922).
32 N. J. L. 70 (1866).
17See also dictum in McCarthy v. DeArmit, supra, note 24.
"See comm. to Sec. 22, A. L. I. Code Crim. Pro., at p. 242.
17 K. L. R. 1015, 33 S. W. 418 (l.8Q).
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the commission of the offense, and that after defendant had struck him
(the officer), then a public offense had been committed in his presence,
and that he might make the arrest without a warrant. The court, in
effect, says that an officer must intervene to prevent the commission of
a felony. But in his intervention, to what extent is it permissible for
him to go? If the officer is able to restrain the personal liberty of
the would-be criminal, it would seem that he in effect arrests him. An
arrest "implies that a person is thereby restrained of his liberty by
some officer or agent of the law," serving 'the end of bringing the
person arrested personally within the custody and control of the
law."
This being so, the officer must have the right of arrest in such
cases, since not to grant him the right to restrain the personal liberty
of the person suspected, would make it practically impossible for him
to carry out the duty which the court says is Imposed on him. True
this right is not expressly given by the code provision here applicable,
but it would seem that the legislature could never have intended that a
contrary result should be reached, and that in this state the general
rule stated above should be followed.
In this state, the rule which allows an officer to arrest without a
warrant a person who is in the act of committing a felony seems very
clear. As has been said above, this rule necessarily implies that at
least part of the offense is committed in the presence of the officer.
This being so, it would seem to be covered exactly by the code provision above. In the case of Dilger v. c'ommonwealth,"t the officers
heard defendant beating hie wife. This was held by the court to be
sufficient grounds for making the arrest without a warrant, as an
offense committed in the presence of the officer. This same view is
followed in Elswic v. Gommonwealt.
Thepe cases represent the ma0
jority American view on the ,matter.
The general rule as to our third situation is that an officer may
arrest a felon without a warrant after he hag committed a felony. As
has been said above, this rple, of necessity, includes offenses committed both in and out of the presence pf the arresting officer. As to
offenses committed ii the presence of the officer, these are directly
covered by the code provision above. There is no need to go into any
&
discussion of this point except to give a partial list of cases.
"
Now quppose that an officer arrests a felon without a warrant for
an offense not committed in the presence of the officer. As to offenses
committed out of the presence of the officer, the Kentucky Code says
that an officer may arrest without a warrant "when he has reasonable
grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony."
,"Lawrence v. Buxton, 102 N. C. 129, 8 S. E. 774 (1889).
88 Ky. 650, 11 K. L. R. 67, 11 S. W. 651 (1889).
202 Ky. 703, 261 S. W. 249 (1924).
See also Weaver v. Com., 211 Ky. 723, 277 S. W. 1012 (1925), and
Cawood v. Com., 229 Ky. 552, 17 S. W. (2nd) 453 (1929).
"Royce v. Com., 194 Ky. 480, 239 S. W. 795 (1922); Lewis v. Com.,
197 Ky. 449, 247 S. W. 749 (1923); Partin v. Com., 197 Ky. 480, 248
S. W. 489 (1923); and Elswick v. Com., supra, note 42.
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The Kentucky courts apparently construe this rule strictly. In the
case of Grauz v. Forge, the court lays down the following rule: "When
the facts are such as reasonably prudent men would have believed
plaintiff guilty and would have acted upon them, we think that the
officer is entitled to make the arrest." This statement fairly represents
the rule in Kentucky. But it must be noted that there may be a case
where the officer arrests on mere suspicion one who has in fact committed a felony, not in the presence of the officer. It would seem that
such an arrest cannot be justified. We must come to the conclusion
that under the Kentucky code and cases, the general rule as to this
situation is not applicable where the offense is committed out of the
officer's presence, and that under such a state of facts only the rules
applicable in situations four and five may be applied. This Is apparently the result reached in Simmons v. Commonweath.
An officer may arrest without a warrant when a felony has actually
been committed and the person arrested may reasonably be suspected
of having committed it, although, in fact, he may not have done so.
An officer may arrest a person without a warrant whom he reasonably
suspects of having committed a felony although in fact no felony has
been committed. Both of these statements are directly covered by the
Kentucky code. Under the statement there it is immaterial whether
or not a felony has actually been committed and this is borne out in
47
the cases. The court in Klotz v. Cook, says, "Peace officers may arrest
any person whom they, upon reasonable ground, believe has committed
a felony, although it afterwards appear that no felony has actually
been perpetrated."18 It is to be noted that mere suspicion Is not, in
this state, sufficient justification for an arrest without a warrant. The
officer must have some knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable man to believe that the person arrested had committed a felony.*
However, the reasonable and probable grounds that will justify an
officer in arresting without a warrant need only be such as would
actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith.*
The Kentucky code provision applicable to the right of a private
s
person to arrest without a warrant states: "A private person may
make an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the
person arrested has committed a felony." Let us see how the application of this section lines up with the rules which we have stated
above.
Under this code provision it would appear that a private individual
is not always entitled to arrest to prevent the commission of a felony.
A private person is not entitled to make an arrest in this state except
183 Ky. 521, 209 S. W. 369, 3 A. L. R. 642 (1919).
203 Ky. 621, 262 S. W. 972 (1924).
4 184 Ky. 735, 212 S. W. 917 (1919).
8 See also Grau v. Forge, supra, note 45, and Lewis v. Com., supra,
note 44.
"Catchings v. Com., 204 Ky. 439, 264 S. W. 1067 (1924).
Com. v. Riley, 192 Ky. 153, 232 S. W. 630 (1921).
1 Section 37.
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when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested
has committed a felony." It would seem to follow then that, where the
attempt to commit the felony is only a misdemeanor (or where the
offender has not yet gone so far as to have committed a criminal attempt), a private citizen is not justified in making the arrest without
a warrant. However, if the attempt is in itself a felony, there would
seem to be no good reason why a private citizen could not make the
arrest without a warrant.
A. private citizen may arrest without a warrant a person who is in
the act of committing a felony. It would seem that the courts of this
state must follow this rule. As has been said above, this rule necessarily comprehends that the crime be committed, at least partly, in the
presence of the person arresting. If the felony is committed in the
presence of any person, he would certainly have reasonable grounds
for believing that that person had committed a felony.
It does not necessarily follow, in this state, that a private person
may arrest anyone who has committed a felony. It would seem that, in
any case, the person making the arrest would have to have a reasonable
suspicion that the person arrested had committed a felony, and that,
if the arresting person did not have such suspicion, the guilt of the
accused would not make the arrest legalPu
A private person may arrest without a warrant a person who is
reasonably suspected of having committed a felony, though such person
may not have done so, if a felony has in fact been committed. This
statement seems to represent the law in Kentucky. In the few decided
cases on the right of a private person to arrest without a warrant, we
find reiterated over and over that all that is necessary is a reasonable
suspicion that the person arrested has committed a felony.4 It is not
the law in Kentucky that it is necessary that a felony actually have
been committed before a private person may justify an arrest without
a warrant. The rule in this state allows a reasonable suspicion to be
all that is necessary. This rule has been upheld in the few Kentucky
cases which could be found on this point.
JouN DAVIs.

3Wright v. Com., 85 Ky. 123, 8 K. L. R. 718, 2 S. W. 904 (1887).
See also Begley v. Com., 22 K. L. R. 1546, 60 S. W. 847 (1901).
" See Ky. Crim. Code, Sec. 37, and Wright v. Com., supra, note 52.
" See Wright v. Com., supra, note 52; Salisbury v. Com., 79 Ky. 425,
3 K. L. R. 211 (1881); and Begley v. Com., supra, note 52.
"See cases cited in note 54, and Mann v. Com., 118 Ky. 800, 82
S. W. 438 (1904).

